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It is a well-known fact that a lack of information will lead to suboptimal decisions. But even when actors jointly 
have all the information they need to make a well-informed decision, they may fail to find a superior alternative. 
This hidden profile paradigm would cause misrepresentations of crisis situations and lead to ineffective 
response. In this research-in-progress paper, we present the first stage of our experimental study on group 
decision making in humanitarian disaster response, in which we want to find out how teams can be supported to 
share more information, make better sense, and ultimately avoid such misrepresentations of crisis situations. 
First results reveal that humanitarian disaster response teams are able to share significantly more information if 
they would make use of more advanced information and communication systems. However, none of the teams 
in the experimental setup managed to find the optimal decision. 
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information management, information pooling. 
INTRODUCTION 
Misrepresenting a crisis situation is disastrous for an effective response. Therefore the starting point in crisis 
response is to make sure that there is free exchange of information, so an accurate picture of the situation can be 
constructed by coordinating and responding organizations (Van de Walle and Turoff, 2008). Organizations 
cannot make the right decisions if their understanding of the situation is not based on all information that is 
available. If humanitarian organizations do not know a) which type of aid is needed b) in which area, and c) 
which organizations are already providing d) what type of aid, there is huge probability that areas are 
overlooked, the wrong type of aid is provided in certain areas, several organizations provide the same type of 
assistance to an area, and organizations deploy first to an area in lesser need than others.  
One would think that the ideal situation of free information exchange would solve these problems. However, 
such problems will also happen if decisions are based on all available information, but this information is 
misinterpreted or misrepresented. Even when people jointly have all the necessary information to make a 
decision, and there is an infrastructure in place for the group to share all information, they often misrepresent the 
situation and make suboptimal decisions. These situations are studied in so-called “hidden profile” experiments.  
This paper describes a research-in-progress of a hidden profile experiment, through which we study the 
influence of information systems support on Sensemaking and information sharing by humanitarian disaster 
response decision making teams, and the effect it has on their performance. Because of the limited space that is 
available and the ongoing nature of our research, we will in this article present a short background on hidden 
profile studies, the experimental setup and some tentative results. 
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HIDDEN PROFILE STUDIES 
A hidden profile exists when group members individually have possession of only a part of the information 
required to reach an optimal decision or solve a problem, so the group needs to pool and process this 
information to solve the problem or reach the optimal decision (Choo, 2007). In hidden profile experiments, 
individuals have both common information, which is known to all group members, and unique information. 
Because the common information supports a suboptimal alternative, the group needs to pool the unique 
information to find the optimal alternative - the hidden profile. 
Stasser and Titus (1985), who are basically the founders of hidden profile tasks, found that groups tend to share, 
discuss, and use information that is known to all the members at the expense of information that is known to a 
single member when jointly making a decision. Other research has confirmed that groups consistently fail to 
pool the available information, achieving distinctly suboptimal decisions (Dennis, 1996; Lightle, Kagel and 
Arkes, 2009; Stasser and Titus, 2003). A number of reasons for this have been reported in literature. One of the 
prominent causes reported in these studies is that groups unequally discuss common information as opposed to 
the group members’ unique information. Other factors include information overload and biased recall of pre-
discussion information indicates (Stasser and Titus, 2003). 
Hidden Profiles and Group Support Systems 
Group Support Systems (GSS) have some benefits in comparison with face-to-face collaboration, such as the 
ability to communicate in parallel with each other and the possibility of storing all contributed information in an 
automated, digital memory (Shirani, 2006). Furthermore, GSS can remove barriers to communication, increase 
equality of participation, and increase information exchange, thereby increasing the quality of decision making. 
There have been a substantial amount of hidden profile studies in which face-to-face groups were compared to 
GSS supported groups, such as by Dennis (1996) and Shirani (2006). The usual outcome of these studies is that 
groups supported by GSS share more information, but the unique information is often not exploited in the 
decision making process and consequently the hidden profile is not found. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
As hidden profiles can occur in practice, we want to find out how crisis response teams can be supported in their 
group decision making, so they share more information and are supported to make better sense of the situation, 
and hence perform better. We observed before (Muhren and Van de Walle, 2009) that humanitarian assessment 
teams now usually communicate through radio when they are traveling by themselves in the country, and meet 
face-to-face later on to discuss their findings. In this way, it takes a lot of time and (traveling) effort to reach a 
decision. A possible solution would be to provide these teams with more advanced information systems, so they 
are better supported to communicate when they are physically separated, for example through Skype (voice and 
chat) communication. The objective of this hidden profile experiment is to simulate both these conditions, and 
to observe the effect of more advanced communication on information sharing, Sensemaking and performance. 
EXPERIMENT 
Design 
In the experiment 48 undergraduate students took part, of which approximately half were Dutch and the other 
half were international students from the United States, Bulgaria, Germany, China, Indonesia, Portugal, Spain, 
and Vietnam. A quarter of the participants were female. The students were taking part in the course “Decision 
Support Systems” at Tilburg University, and were obliged to take part in the experiment as they had to write an 
individual assignment based on their experiences in the experiment. 
The participants were randomly assigned to a three-person team, and the teams were randomly assigned to a 
treatment condition regarding the communication mode. Half of the teams were assigned to the “simple 
communication” condition, which reflected the reality of humanitarian assessment teams, in which they 
communicated through radio communication in the first 20 minutes and convened face-to-face in the second 20 
minutes. The other half of the teams were assigned to the “advanced communication” condition, which reflected 
the possible advancement in communication within teams by using Skype’s voice and chat functions 
continuously, and not gathering face-to-face at all. We also altered the information load that the groups were 
exposed to, but it is not the objective of this paper to discuss this treatment condition. Muhren et al.  Exploring Decision-Relevant Information Pooling 
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Scenario 
The exercise was based on a floods scenario, developed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) for exercise purposes, which affected the fictive country of Juliandia. Following heavy rains in 
the North Eastern Provinces of Juliandia, severe flooding had especially affected three Juliandian districts, all 
bordering the neighboring country of Emirana: North District, Norktown District, and Grotti District. 
The students were part of three-person UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination) teams 
that were deployed to the affected districts to conduct rapid initial assessments. These rapid initial assessments 
should help determine the extent of the disaster and its impact on the population as well as needs for 
international assistance during the immediate relief phase. The role of the team was to advise the United Nations 
Humanitarian Coordinator to which district the international humanitarian organizations need to deploy first. 
The students were told to be travelling through the area separately to conduct assessments by observing the 
impact of the disaster and interviewing survivors, school teachers, priests, and key officials. In reality, the 
students were each seated in a one-person cubicle, and were presented a set of information elements which they 
gathered on their imaginary assessment trip on six different sub-categories of humanitarian assistance: health, 
water sanitation and hygiene, food and nutrition, shelter and non-food items, logistics access and security, and 
protection. Although it was not explicitly mentioned, they were given two types of information for each of the 
three affected districts: positive information and negative information. Positive information indicated that 
humanitarian assistance is needed for some sub-category of humanitarian assistance; negative information 
indicated that a sub-category of humanitarian assistance is not needed in the specified area. These information 
elements were based on OCHA training documents and the authors’ experiences in humanitarian workshops, 
case studies and exercises (Muhren and Van de Walle, 2009; Muhren, Van Den Eede and Van de Walle, 2008; 
Muhren, Van Den Eede and Van de Walle, 2009). 
The students were explicitly told that the international humanitarian community can respond to all the types of 
needs listed as sub-categories of their assessment, and that they could consider all sub-categories to be of equal 
importance to each other for this exercise. For example, a need in “health” was said to have the same importance 
of humanitarian response as a need in “logistics access and security”. The students were instructed to discuss the 
situation according to their assessment results with the other team members and to give the Humanitarian 
Coordinator an advice on the order of priority of the three districts for international humanitarian assistance. 
Hidden profile outline 
Team members received either 27 information elements in the low information load condition and 45 
information elements in the high information load condition, of on average 35 words each. Every team member 
had an equal mix of common and unique information. Common information is information that is known to all 
team members; unique information is information that is known to only one team member. 
Information was distributed by us as follows. All positive information about Norktown District was common 
information; all negative information about Norktown District was unique information. In contrary, all positive 
information about North District was unique information; all negative information about North District was 
common information. The positive and negative information about Grotti District was approximately equally 
divided into common and unique information. 
All team members had an equal amount of unique information elements, but not all the same information. In 
total, there was about 50% more positive than negative information for North District, and about 50% more 
negative than positive information for both Norktown District and Grotti District. If therefore all information is 
put together, it is obvious that Grotti District and Norktown District already get more humanitarian assistance 
than is needed, and that North District needs more humanitarian assistance than is provided. North District is the 
hidden profile: Given the information, it is the best alternative to send immediate humanitarian assistance to. 
Difference to traditional hidden profile studies 
In our experiment we did not ask the teams to “pick one right alternative” as is most common in hidden profile 
studies (e.g. identify the murderer, the “best” candidate for president), because in humanitarian assistance – as in 
many other situations – it is very difficult to say that there is one right course of action. Instead, we ask the 
teams to rank-order (prioritize) the alternatives (cf. Hollingshead, 1996; cf. Mennecke, 1997). This is more in 
line with reality, as a decision to send scarce humanitarian relief to the alternative that is supported by the least 
amount of arguments is not a bad decision, but one of less priority. On the other hand, identifying an innocent 
person as the murderer is a bad decision. Muhren et al.  Exploring Decision-Relevant Information Pooling 
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In most hidden profile studies, participants have to hand in the information elements after they have read them. 
In our experiment the participants had perfect recall (Hollingshead, 1996): We did not ask the teams to hand in 
the information elements before they started the group discussion, but allowed them to keep the information 
elements.  This is more in line with real-life humanitarian assistance, as it is unlikely that assessment team 
members will lose information they collected. To prevent the hidden profile from being too easy to solve, we 
increased the number of information elements compared to traditional hidden profile studies, even in the “low 
information load” condition. But because we feared that the teams would find the hidden profile easily since 
they had perfect recall, as happened in one of the few other perfect recall hidden profile studies (Lightle et al., 
2009), we increased the difficulty for the teams. Instead of creating conflict in the decision making teams by 
distributing the information elements in a way that team members each would favor another alternative before 
discussion, we made sure that all team members were favoring the same (wrong) decision alternative: Norktown 
District. As we will see now, however, this probably caused too strong a bias. 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Unfortunately, none of the sixteen teams managed to uncover the hidden profile and choose North District as the 
District that is most in need of humanitarian assistance. We however observed a difference in information 
sharing between the two communication mode conditions. 
 
  Communication mode 






Relative percentage of 
common information shared 
Simple communication  31,800  22,2459  8  F = 3,505 
df = 1 
p = 0,082  Advanced communication  52,238  21,4096  8 
Relative percentage of 
unique information shared 
Simple communication  15,000  12,6819  8  F = 8,404 
df = 1 
p = 0,012  Advanced communication  37,575  18,0086  8 
Relative percentage of total 
information shared 
Simple communication  21,723  15,9119  8  F = 6,838 
df = 1 
p = 0,020  Advanced communication  43,445  17,2876  8 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results of the effect of communication mode on information sharing 
 
ANOVA results show that groups that were using advanced communication shared more common information 
(at p < 0,1 significance level), shared more unique information (p < 0,05) and shared more information in total 
(p < 0,05) than groups using simple communication. 
DISCUSSION 
All participants were aware of the positive information about Norktown District and negative information about 
North District; both the negative information about Norktown District and the positive information about North 
District were equally spread among the team members. Most of the people therefore thought that Norktown was 
most in need of humanitarian assistance before the group discussion started, and North District was least in 
need. Grotti District was usually somewhere in the middle. The bias that this caused appeared to be too big to 
overcome. If all information elements would have been shared by team members, so that unique information 
would become common information and everybody would have the same information, it would have been clear 
that North District had more positive than negative information, and both Grotti District and Norktown District 
had more negative than positive information. Although the advanced communication groups shared significantly 
more information than the simple communication groups, hardly any team revised their initial decision of not 
taking North District seriously into consideration and consequently did not find the hidden profile. 
We believe that in this way, the experiment was not representative for a real humanitarian disaster situation. 
Based on their relevant experience, professional humanitarian disaster responders would not a-priori discard an 
area for humanitarian response. Beforehand we were afraid that – as happened in previous hidden profile 
research – groups would find the hidden profile easily when being able to keep the information elements during 
the group discussions. In hindsight we can conclude that we made the experiment too difficult for the students, Muhren et al.  Exploring Decision-Relevant Information Pooling 
 
Proceedings of the 7
th International ISCRAM Conference – Seattle, USA, May 2010  5 
and should have created some conflict in a-priori preferences for the alternatives. However, it is already 
promising to see that groups using voice and chat communication share more information than groups who 
reflect the current reality of humanitarian assessment teams, and that these groups might not need to convene 
face-to-face for more efficient information sharing. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Because of limited space for this research-in-progress article and the ongoing nature of our experiment analysis, 
we have not been able to discuss the role of Sensemaking in our hidden profile experiment or our second 
treatment condition: the altering of the information load that teams were exposed to. We are currently analyzing 
the role of Sensemaking, which we will discuss in our future research. Moreover, we are planning to conduct a 
similar hidden profile experiment with more participating teams, in which we will reduce the preferential bias, 
and create a conflicting situation in which two or maybe three students in a team have a different preference. 
Another interesting topic for future research is to examine alternative ways of how information could be 
collected and shared, such as through pictures and video, on Sensemaking and decision making by humanitarian 
assessment teams. This will most probably have to be studied in a field experimental setting, rather than in a 
laboratory experiment. 
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